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Abstract
We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from
a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem aims to
design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to truthfully report their cost, and maximizes
the buyer’s value while guaranteeing that the total payment does not exceed her budget. Such
budget feasible mechanisms can model a buyer in a crowdsourcing market interested in recruiting
a set of workers (sellers) to accomplish a task for her.
This budget feasible mechanism design problem was introduced by Singer in 2010. There
have been a number of improvements on the approximation guarantee of such mechanisms since
then. We consider the general case where the buyer’s valuation is a monotone submodular
function. We offer two general frameworks for simple mechanisms, and by combining these
frameworks, we significantly improve on the best known results for this problem, while also
simplifying the analysis. For example, we improve the approximation guarantee for the general
monotone submodular case from 7.91 to 5; and for the case of large markets (where each in-
dividual item has negligible value) from 3 to 2.58. More generally, given an r approximation
algorithm for the optimization problem (ignoring incentives), our mechanism is a r+ 1 approx-
imation mechanism for large markets, an improvement from 2r2. We also provide a similar
parameterized mechanism without the large market assumption, where we achieve a 4r + 1
approximation guarantee.
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1 Introduction
We study prior-free budget feasible mechanism design problem, where a single buyer aims to buy
a set of items, each from a different seller. Budget feasible mechanism design aims to maximize
the value of the buyer, while keeping the total payments bellow the budget. We offer simple and
universally truthful mechanisms for this problem, significantly improving previous bounds. This
problem was introduced by [Sin10], and models the problem of crowdsourcing platforms, such as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, where a requester, with a set of tasks at hand, wishes to procure
a set of workers to accomplish her tasks. Each worker has a private cost for his service. We
offer universally truthful mechanisms with good approximation guarantee for this problem that
incentivizes the workers to report their true cost.
We give two very simple parametrized mechanisms, assuming the buyer’s valuation is a general
monotone (non-decreasing) submodular function. Monotone submodular functions are widely used
and general, submodularity capturing the diminishing returns property of adding items. Submodu-
lar value functions are the most general class of functions where the optimization problem (without
considering incentives) can be solved approximately in polynomial time using a value oracle. We
consider this problem in the general case, as well as the special case where each item individually
does not have a significant value compared to the optimum.
Our Model We consider the problem of a single buyer with a budget B facing a set of multiple
sellers A. We assume that each seller i ∈ A has a single indivisible item and has a private cost ci,
and the buyer has no prior knowledge of the private costs. The utility of a seller for selling her
item and receiving payment pi is pi − ci. We only study universally truthful mechanisms, i.e. the
mechanisms in which sellers truthfully report their costs, and do not have incentive to misreport.
Since each seller i ∈ A only has a single item, we interchangeably use i to denote the seller or his
item. We assume that v(S), the value of the buyer for a subset of items S ⊆ A, is a monotone
(non-decreasing) submodular function.
The budget feasibility constraint enforces the total payments to the sellers to never be higher
than the budget. The goal of this paper is to design simple, universally truthful, budget feasible
mechanisms that maximize the value of the buyer. We compare the performance of our mechanism
with the true optimum without computational or incentive limitation, the total cost of the items
selected needs to be bellow the budget. With this comparison in mind, incentive compatible
mechanisms that do not run in polynomial time are also of interest.
Our Contribution We offer two classes of parameterized mechanisms. In Section 3.1, we study
the class of parameterized threshold mechanisms that decide on adding items based on a threshold
of the marginal contribution of each item over its cost (bang per buck), using a parameter γ. In
section 3.2, we consider another parameterized class, called the oracle mechanisms, which adds
items in decreasing order of bang per buck, till reaching an α fraction of the true optimum, without
considering the budget. In section 3 we analyze these two parametrized mechanisms for general
monotone submodular valuations. In section 4 we combine the two mechanisms to get an improved
result for large markets. See Table 1 for a summary of our results for the general problem. In section
5 we focus on the application to a problem of markets with heterogenous tasks [CGL11, GNS14].
• In section 3.1 we consider threshold mechanismGreedy-TM, andRandom-TM, that chooses
randomly between the single item of highest value, and the output of the Greedy-TM mech-
anisms. Most of the mechanisms presented in [Sin10], [CGL11], [SK13], and some of the
mechanisms of [AGN14] are special cases of this framework. We show that for monotone
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Rand Rand∗ Det∗ Det, LM Rand, Oracle Det, Oracle, LM
Previous work 7.91 7.91 8.34 3 − 2r2
Our results 5 4 4.56 2.58 4r or 4r + 1 1 + r
Table 1: The top numbers are the previously known best guarantees, r ≥ 1 is the approximation ratio of the
oracle used by the mechanism, ∗ indicates that the mechanism has exponential running time. Rand and Det
stand for randomized and deterministic mechanisms, and LM indicates the large market assumption. The
4r guarantee requires an additional assumption for the oracle, without the assumption the bound is 4r + 1.
submodular valuations, with the right choice of the parameter γ, our randomized threshold
mechanism is universally truthful, budget feasible and can achieve a 5 approximation of the
optimum. This improves on the best previously known bound of 7.91 which is due to [CGL11].
• In section 3.2, we give another parameterized class of mechanisms, Greedy-OM andGreedy-
EOM, called oracle mechanisms, which add items in the bang per bunk order until an α frac-
tion of the optimum value is obtained, for a parameter α. The mechanism Greedy-EOM uses
the true optimum value, while Greedy-OM uses a polynomial time approximation instead.
We show that keeping the total value of the winning set at most a fraction of the optimum,
guarantees that the mechanism is budget feasible. The large market oracle mechanisms of
[AGN14] are a special case of these mechanisms.
For the case when the algorithm has access to an oracle computing the true optimum value,
we show that with the right choice of α, our oracle mechanism Random-EOM is universally
truthful, budget feasible and achieves a 4 approximation of the optimum for monotone sub-
modular values, improving the bound of 7.91 of [CGL11]. We also use a derandomization
idea, which is similar to that of [CGL11], to give an (exponential time) oracle mechanism
which achieves 4.56 approximation of the optimum, improving the 8.34 bound of [CGL11].
The mechanisms Random-OM and Greedy-OM, run in polynomial time, using an r-
approximation oracle as a subroutine instead of the optimum. We show that with the right
choice of α, Greedy-OM is universally truthful, budget feasible, and achieves a 4r+1 approx-
imation of the optimum (which improves to 4r when the oracle used is a greedy algorithm).
• In section 4, we combine our two parameterized mechanisms by running both, and outputting
the intersection of the two sets. Taking the intersection allows us to use larger values of the
parameters γ and α and keep the mechanism budget feasible. We show that our simple
mechanism is universally truthful. For the right choice of α and γ, our mechanism is deter-
ministic, truthful, budget feasible and has an approximation guarantee of 1 + r, improving
the bound 2r2 of [AGN14] (where r is the approximation guarantee of the oracle used). Using
the greedy algorithm of [Svi04] (which was also analyzed in [KMN99] for linear valuations),
the approximation guarantee of our mechanism is 1 + ee−1 ' 2.58.
• In section 5, we show how that our results for submodular valuations can be used for the
problem of Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks of [GNS14]. Our mechanism of
section 4, gives a deterministic truthful and budget feasible mechanism with an 1+ ee−1 ≈ 2.58
approximation guarantee for large markets. The previous best result is the randomized truth-
ful (in expectation) mechanism of [GNS14]. We match their guarantee with a deterministic
truthful mechanism.
Related Work Prior free budget feasible mechanism design for buying a set of items, each
from a different seller, has been introduced by [Sin10]. For monotone submodular valuations,
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which is the focus of our paper, [CGL11] improved the mechanism and its analysis to achieve a
7.91 approximation guarantee, and also derandomized the mechanism to get a deterministic (but
exponential time) mechanism with an approximation guarantee of 8.34.
[SK13] considered the problem for an application in community sensing and gave a mechanism
with a 4.75 approximation guarantee for large markets. [AGN14] improved the result of [SK13]
achieving a 3 approximation guarantee for large markets with a polynomial time mechanism and
a 2 approximation guarantee with an exponential time mechanism. [AGN14] also proposed a
mechanism that given an r approximation oracle for maximizing monotone submodular functions,
has a 2r2 approximation guarantee.
The problem of budget feasible mechanisms for value maximization has also been considered
with other valuation functions. For example, for additive valuations the best known mechanism
achieves an approximation bound of 2+
√
2 and 3 with a deterministic and randomized mechanisms
respectively due to [CGL11], who also gave a 1 +
√
2 lower bound for approximation ratio of any
truthful budget feasible mechanism in this setting. In large markets with additive valuations,
[AGN14] improved these results and gave a budget feasible mechanism with an approximation
guarantee of ee−1 with a matching lower bound.
[Sin10] also considered the budget feasible mechanism design problem with matching constraint:
the principal is required to select a matching of a bipartite graph, where each individual edge is
an agent (with a private cost and a public value). [CGL11] consider the knapsack problem with
heterogeneous items, which is the special case of this problem where the bipartite graph is a set of
disjoint stars. Their approximation bound mentioned above, of 2 +
√
2 and 3 with a deterministic
and randomized mechanisms, also extend to this case. [GNS14] considered a variant of the problem
motivated by Crowdsourcing Markets, where one side of the graph are agents with private costs,
and the other side are tasks, each with a value for the principal, and an edge (a, t) represents that
agent a can do task t. They give a randomized truthful (in expectation) mechanism with a 1 + ee−1
approximation guarantee for this problem under the large market assumption. We’ll discuss this
special case in section 5, and give a deterministic truthful mechanism matching their approximation
guarantee.
Prior free budget feasible mechanisms has also been studied for more general valuation functions.
Monotone submodular valuations are the most general class of valuation functions for which a
constant factor approximation guarantee with a polynomial time (with a value oracle), truthful and
budget feasible mechanism is known. For subadditive valuations [DPS11] introduced a mechanism
using a demand oracle (more powerful than the value oracle we use). The current best bound
is an O( lognlog logn) approximation guarantee due to [BCGL12]. [BCGL12] also gave randomized
mechanism that achieves a constant (768) approximation guarantee for fractionally subadditive
(XOS) valuations, also using a demand oracle.
Some papers consider the Bayesian setting, where cost of each agent comes from known indepen-
dent distributions. [BCGL12] gave a constant-competitive mechanism for subadditive valuations
(with a very large constant). [BH16] gave a ( ee−1)
2-competitive posted pricing mechanism for mono-
tone submodular valuations for large markets, using a cost version for defining the largeness of the
market. The benchmark (optimum) used in [BH16] is the outcome of optimal Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism, while others (including us) have used the significantly higher, optimum with
respect to the budgeted pure optimization problem as their benchmark. It is interesting to compare
our results for large markets to the approximation guarantee of ( ee−1)
2 ≈ 2.5 of the mechanism in
[BH16]. While this bound is ≈ 0.08 better than our bound, their benchmark, the optimal Bayesian
incentive compatible mechanism, can be a factor of ee−1 lower than our benchmark of the optimum
ignoring incentives [AGN14]. Even when the cost of sellers come from a uniform distributions, and
the value of each item is 1, the ratio between the two benchmarks is
√
2.
4
2 Preliminaries
We consider the problem of a single buyer with a budget B facing a set of multiple sellers A, each
selling a single item. We let n denote the number of sellers and we assume A = [n]. We assume
that the value v(S) of the buyer for a set of items S, is a (non-decreasing) submodular function,
that is, satisfies v(S) ≤ v(T ) for every S ⊆ T , and v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for every
set S, T ⊆ A. For every i ∈ A and S ⊆ A, we define mi(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S), i.e. the marginal
value of i with respect to subset S. Note that v(.) is monotone submodular if and only if for every
S, T ⊆ A we have:
v(T ) ≤ v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S
mi(S).
The large market assumption. In Section 4, we consider large markets, assuming that the value
of each agent is small compared to the optimum, i.e. v(i) opt(A) for all i ∈ [n]. For simplicity, we
state our approximation bounds for large markets in the limit1, assuming θ = maxi∈[n]
v(i)
opt(A) → 0.
The mechanism design problem of selecting sellers maximizing the buyer’s value subject to his
budget constraint, is a single parameter mechanism design problem, in which each bidder (seller)
has one private value (the cost of her item). We design truthful deterministic and individually
rational mechanisms, as well as universally truthful and individually rational randomized mecha-
nisms. A randomized mechanism is universally truthful if it is a randomization among deterministic
mechanisms, each of which are truthful. We use Myerson’s characterization for truthful mecha-
nisms (theorem 2.1), stating that a mechanism is truthful and individually rational if and only if
the choice of selecting each item is monotone in its declared cost, and winners are paid threshold
payments that are above their declared cost.
Theorem 2.1. [Mye81] In single parameter domains, a normalized mechanism M = (f, p) is
truthful if and only if
• f is monotone: ∀i ∈ [n], if c′i ≤ ci then i ∈ f(ci, c−i) implies i ∈ f(c′i, c−i), or equivalently,
c′i /∈ f(c′i, c−i) implies ci /∈ f(ci, c−i).
• Winners are paid threshold payments: if i ∈ [A] is a winner and receives payment pi,
then pi = inf{ci : i /∈ f(ci, c−i)}.
In order to show a mechanism is universally truthful and budget feasible, it suffices to show
that the allocation is monotone and by using the threshold payments, the total payments are not
more than the budget. Similar to [DPS11, CGL11, BCGL12, SK13], we assume that the payments
are threshold payments and only specify the allocation rule. At the end of each section, we briefly
explain how the payment rule of the mechanisms in that section can be computed. In all our
mechanisms if a seller bids a cost more than B, he will not be selected in the winning set, hence
will have utility 0. This combined with the fact that all our mechanisms are truthful, implies
individual rationality, i.e. in all of our mechanisms utility of sellers are non-negative.
3 Parameterized Mechanisms for Submodular Valuations
In this section we present two simple parameterized mechanisms. We show that these parameterized
mechanisms provide good approximation guarantees, and are monotone and hence can be turned
1By having a θ-large market assumption instead, the approximation guarantees for our large market mechanisms
increases by a factor of (1 − cθ)−1, where c ∈ (0, 4) is a constant which is different for each mechanism. We omit
stating the exact value of c for each mechanism separately.
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into truthful mechanisms with payments defined appropriately. We analyze the approximation
guarantee of these mechanisms with and without the large market assumption and give conditions
that make these mechanisms budget feasible.
Let S0 = ∅, and for each i ∈ [n], recursively define Si = Si−1 ∪ {arg maxj∈A\Si−1(
mj(Si−1)
cj
)},
adding the item with maximum marginal value to cost ratio, to Si−1. To simplify notation, we will
assume without loss of generality that {i} = Si \ Si−1. All of our mechanisms sort the items in
descending order of marginal bang for buck at the beginning and consider items in this order.
3.1 The Threshold Mechanism
Our threshold mechanism is a framework generalizing the mechanisms of Singer [Sin10] and Chen
et al [CGL11]. We consider items in increasing cost-to-marginal value order, as defined above. Our
greedy threshold mechanism, Greedy-TM, sets a threshold for the cost to marginal value ratio of
the items, compared to the ratio of the budget to the total value of the set we have so far. Using
a parameter γ, the mechanism adds items while they are relatively cheap compared to the total so
far.
The Greedy-TM mechanism works well for large markets where each individual item has small
value compared to the optimum. In the general case, we will randomly choose between just selecting
the item with maximum individual value and cost below the budget, or running Greedy-TM. We
call the resulting randomized mechanism Random-TM(γ,A,B).
Greedy-TM(γ,A,B)
(Greedy Threshold Mechanism)
Let k = 1
while k ≤ |A| and ckmk(Sk−1) ≤ γ Bv(Sk) do
k = k + 1
end
return Sk−1
Random-TM(γ,A,B)
(Random Threshold Mechanism)
Let A = {i : ci ≤ B}
Let i∗ = argmaxi∈[n](v(i))
With probability γ+1γ+2 do
return Greedy-TM(γ,A,B)
halt
return i∗
The randomized mechanisms for submodular functions in Singer [Sin10] is similar to Random-
TM with parameter γ = e−112e−4 and the improved mechanism of Chen et al [CGL11] is equivalent
to Random-TM with γ = 0.5.
Monotonicity of the mechanisms is easy to see: if someone is not chosen, he cannot be selected
by increasing his cost (decreasing his marginal bang per buck).
Lemma 3.1. For every fixed γ ∈ (0, 1], the mechanism Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) is monotone.
We show that for every fixed γ ∈ (0, 1], Random-TM(γ,A,B) achieves a 1 + 2γ approximation
of the optimum, improving the bound of [CGL11]. The key difference is that we compare the
output of Greedy-TM directly with the true optimum, rather than a fractional greedy solution.
Doing this not only improves the approximation factor, but also simplifies the analysis.
Lemma 3.2. For every fixed γ ∈ (0, 1], if Sk−1 = Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) then
(1 +
1
γ
)v(Sk−1) +
1
γ
v(i∗) ≥ opt(A)
Proof. Let S∗ be the optimum. By monotonicity and submodularity of v(.), we have
v(S∗)− v(Sk−1) ≤ v(S∗ ∪ Sk−1)− v(Sk−1) ≤
∑
i∈S∗\Sk−1
mi(Sk−1) =
∑
i∈S∗\Sk−1
ci
mi(Sk−1)
ci
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By using the fact that k ∈ arg maxi∈A\Sk−1
mi(Sk−1)
ci
, we get
mi(Sk−1)
ci
≤ mk(Sk−1)ck . Since k is not in
the winning set ckmk(Sk−1) > γ
B
v(Sk)
. Using these we get
∑
i∈S∗\Sk−1
ci
mi(Sk−1)
ci
≤ c(S∗ \ Sk−1)mk(Sk−1)
ck
< B(
1
γ
v(Sk)
B
) =
1
γ
v(Sk)
Finally, by definition of v(Sk) and using submodularity, we have
1
γ
v(Sk) ≤ 1
γ
(v(Sk−1) + v(k)) ≤ 1
γ
(v(Sk−1) + v(i∗))
By putting all the above together and rearranging the terms, we get the desired inequality.
By using the above lemma for the performance of Random-TM, we can get the following
approximation bound for Random-TM(γ,A,B).
Theorem 3.3. For every fixed γ ∈ (0, 1], Random-TM(γ,A,B) is universally truthful, and has
approximation ratio of 1 + 2γ .
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 the mechanism is monotone and hence universally truthful.
To prove the approximation ratio, let S be the outcome of the mechanism. The mechanism
chooses Sk−1 = Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) with probability γ+1γ+2 and i
∗ with probability 1− γ+1γ+2 = 1γ+2 .
So we have
E[v(S)] =
γ + 1
γ + 2
v(Sk−1) +
1
γ + 2
v(i∗)
⇒(1 + 2
γ
)E[v(S)] =
γ + 1
γ
v(Sk−1) +
1
γ
v(i∗)
So by using lemma 3.2 we have
(1 +
2
γ
)E[v(S)] ≥ opt(A)
The mechanisms Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) and Random-TM(γ,A,B) are not necessarily bud-
get feasible for an arbitrary choice of γ. However, [CGL11] shows that Random-TM(0.5, A,B)
(which they call Random-SM) is budget feasible. We include a simplified proof in Section A for
completeness.
Theorem 3.4 ([CGL11]). Random-TM(0.5, A,B) and Greedy-TM(0.5, A,B) are budget feasi-
ble.
Combining Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.3 for the general case, and using Lemma 3.2 directly,
instead of Theorem 3.3 for the case of large market, where v(i∗)  opt(A), we get the following
theorem. The bound for large markets is matching the best approximation guarantee of Anari et
al [AGN14] for submodular functions with computational constraint. In section 4 we improve this
bound.
Corollary 3.5. Random-TM(0.5, A,B) is truthful, budget feasible and has approximation ratio
of 5. For the case of large market case, where v(i∗) opt(A), Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) is is truthful,
budget feasible and has approximation ratio of 3.
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We note that our approximation analysis for Random-TM(0.5, A,B) is tight. To see this
consider the following example (with additive valuation): assume we have 5 items numbered from
1 to 5 with budget 4. Let v1 = 1 and c1 = 0, and let vi = 1 −  and ci = 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ 5. The
mechanism chooses item 1, however since 1 > 42
1−
2− , none of the other items is in the winning
set of Greedy-TM(0.5, A, 4). So the value of the Greedy-TM(0.5, A, 4) as well as the value of
Random-TM(0.5, A, 4) is 1. However, optimum can select all of the items and get the value 5−4.
Since  can be arbitrarily small, Random-TM(0.5, A,B) is at most a 5-approximation.
The threshold payment of each agent i in the winning set for the threshold mechanisms in this
section can be computed by increasing i’s cost until he reaches the threshold that makes him not
eligible to be in the winning set, while keeping the cost of other agents fixed. In order to compute
this number in polynomial time, it is enough to fix other agents’ costs and see where in the sorted
list of marginal bang-per-bucks this agent can be appear such that the inequality of Greedy-
TM(γ,A,B) still holds for her. The more detailed characterization of these threshold payments is
similar to that of [Sin10].
3.2 The Oracle Mechanism
Here, we provide a different class of parameterized mechanisms. This class of mechanisms requires
an oracle Oracle(A,B), which considers the optimization problem of maximizing the value subject
to the total cost not exceeding the budget B, and returns a value which is close to optimum. Let
opt(A,B) denote the optimum value of this optimization problem. We assume that opt(A,B) ≥
Oracle(A,B). The oracle is an r approximation, if we also have r ·Oracle(A,B) ≥ opt(A,B). For
instance the greedy algorithm of Sviridenko [Svi04] can be used as an oracle with r = ee−1 ≈ 1.58.
Exponential time mechanism. We start with a simple exponential time oracle mechanism,
Greedy-EOM, using the optimal solution value opt(A,B) as an oracle. The optimum value is
simpler to use, as it is monotone in the cost of the agents2. Later, we show how to use a polynomial
time approximation oracle instead of opt(A,B), with a small sacrifice in the approximation ratio
while keeping the mechanism truthful and budget feasible. Our mechanisms in this section also
sort the items in decreasing order of bang-per-buck, as explained in the beginning of the section.
Greedy-EOM(α,A,B)
(exp. time oracle mechanism)
Let v∗ = opt(A,B)
Let k = 1
while v(Sk) ≤ αv∗ do
k = k + 1
end
return Sk−1
Random-EOM(α,A,B)
(exp. time oracle mechanism)
Let A = {i : ci ≤ B}
Let i∗ = argmaxi∈[n](v(i))
With probability 12 do
return
Greedy-EOM(α,A,B)
halt
return i∗
Deterministic-EOM(α,A,B)
(det. exp. time oracle mechanism)
Let A = {i : ci ≤ B}
Let i∗ = argmaxi∈[n](v(i))
Let v = opt(A \ {i∗}, B)
if v(i∗) ≥
√
17−3
4 v then
return i∗
else
return
Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B)
end
Lemma 3.6. For every fixed α ∈ (0, 1], Greedy-EOM(α,A,B) is monotone, and if Sk−1 =
Greedy-EOM(α,A,B) then 1αv(Sk−1) +
1
αv(i
∗) ≥ opt(A,B).
Proof. We first argue that the mechanism is monotone. Assume i ∈ A and i /∈ Sk−1. If i increase
his cost, it cannot increase the value of v∗ = opt(A,B). Furthermore, by increasing i’s cost,
2For large markets, Anari et al [AGN14] use an exponential time mechanism which is similar to Greedy-
EOM(0.5, A,B)
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her marginal bang per buck decreases, which cannot help him get selected, so the mechanism is
monotone.
To see the approximation bound simply note that by the definition of the mechanism we have
v(Sk) > αv
∗. So v(Sk−1) + v(i∗) > v(Sk−1) + v(k) > αv∗.
By using lemma 3.6, it is easy to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. For every fixed α ∈ (0, 1], Random-EOM(α,A,B) is universally truthful, and if
S = Random-EOM(α,A,B) then 2αE[v(S)] ≥ opt(A).
Proof. By using lemma 3.6 and similar argument to proof of truthfulness in theorem 3.3, it is easy
to see that the mechanism is universally truthful.
By definition of Random-EOM(α,A,B) we have
E[v(S)] =
1
2
v(S) +
1
2
v(i∗)
⇒ 2
α
E[v(s)] =
1
α
v(S) +
1
α
v(i∗)
By using lemma 3.6 the proof is complete.
Now we show that for the choice of α = 0.5, Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible, so
Random-EOM(0.5, A,B) is universally truthful, budget feasible, and a 4 approximation to the
optimum. A bit more complex analog of this lemma for the mechanism using an approximation
algorithm in place of the true optimum will be lemma 3.12.
Lemma 3.8. By using threshold payments, Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible.
Proof. Let pi be the threshold payment for agent i. Let Sk−1 =Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B). For every
i ∈ Sk−1, we show that if i deviates to a bid of bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) , he cannot be selected, implying
that the threshold payment pi ≤ mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) . By proving this we get that
∑
i∈Sk−1 pi ≤∑
i∈Sk−1 mi(Si−1)
B
v(Sk−1)
= B, where the last inequality hold by recalling that mi(Si−1) = v(Si)−
v(Si−1), so the sum telescopes.
So the mechanism is budget feasible.
We prove the inequality claimed above by contradiction: assume that i deviates to bi >
mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) and is still in the winning set. Let b be the new vector of costs with i bidding bi
and all other agents bidding their true cost. Note that the order in which items are considered after
item i−1 is also effected by the change in i’s claimed cost. Now let j be the step in the mechanism
in which i is added to the winning set after he deviates to bi and S
′
j be the wining set after that
step, where S′z for z ∈ [n] is defined similar to Sz but with cost vector b instead of c. Let S∗ be the
optimum solution with v(S∗) = v∗. Let S∗ \ S′j = {t1, t2, . . . , tq}, T0 = ∅, and Tz = {tl : l ∈ [z]}.
Since i is the only item that has increased his cost and i ∈ S′j , we have
c(S∗) ≥ b(S∗ ∪ S′j)− b(S′j) =
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
By submodularity and by the fact that the mechanism choose the ordering having item i in position
j (with costs b) we have that mtz(S
′
j ∪Tz−1) ≤ mtz(S′j−1) and btz/mtz(S′j−1) ≤ bi/mi(S′j−1). Using
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these two inequalities we get∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
≥
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j−1)
≥
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
bi
mi(S′j−1)
=
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗ ∪ S′j)− v(S′j)) ≥
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗)− v(S′j))
Now by using the contradiction assumption, and the fact that Si−1 ⊆ S′j−1, we get
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗)− v(S′j)) > B
v(S∗)− v(S′j)
v(Sk−1)
By combining the above inequalities and using the fact that v(S′j), v(Sk−1) < αv
∗ and α = 0.5, we
have c(S∗) > B which is a contradiction, so the mechanism is budget feasible.
Corollary 3.9. By using threshold payments, Random-EOM(0.5, A,B) is universally truthful,
budget feasible and a 4 approximation of the optimum.
Next we offer a simple deterministic version of this mechanism, with a significantly better
approximation factor, improving the previously known 8.34 approximation exponential time mech-
anism of [CGL11] to a guarantee of 4.56. In order to derandomize Random-EOM, we would like
to check if the optimum is large enough compared to the best valued item. To keep the mechanisms
monotone, we will compare the value of the highest valued item i∗ to the optimum after removing
item i∗.
Theorem 3.10. By using threshold payments, Deterministic-EOM is truthful, budget feasible
and has an approximation ratio of 4.56.
Proof. i∗ cannot change opt(A\{i∗}, B), so since Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B) is monotone and budget
feasible, Deterministic-EOM is truthful and budget feasible.
In order to prove the approximation ratio, we consider two cases:
Case 1: v(i∗) ≥
√
17−3
4 v =
√
17−3
4 opt(A \ {i∗}, B): in this case the algorithm returns i∗, and we have
(
4√
17− 3 + 1)v(i
∗) ≥ opt(A \ {i∗}, B) + v(i∗) ≥ opt(A,B)
Case 2: v(i∗) <
√
17−3
4 v ≤
√
17−3
4 opt(A,B): let Sk−1 = Greedy-EOM(0.5, A,B). In this case, by
lemma 3.6, we have
2v(Sk−1) + 2v(i∗) ≥ opt(A)
⇒2v(Sk−1) + 2(
√
17− 3
4
)opt(A) ≥ opt(A)
⇒ 2
1−
√
17−3
2
v(Sk−1) ≥ opt(A)
So in any case the approximation ratio is 4√
17−3 + 1 =
2
1−
√
17−3
2
' 4.56
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The Polynomial Time Oracle Mechanism. Next we offer a version of the above mechanism
using an oracle in place of the optimum value opt(A,B), as finding the optimum for monotone
submodular maximization with a knapsack constraint cannot be done in polynomial time. Note
that naively using the outcome of an oracle, which is not optimum, can break monotonicity. To
see this, note that in proof of monotonicity for Greeding-EOM(α,A,B), we use the fact that
if an item increases his cost, he cannot increase the value of opt(A,B). If we replace opt(A,B)
with the outcome of a sub-optimal oracle (for instance a greedy algorithm), this is no longer true:
if one increases the cost of all the items that are not in the optimum set to be more than the
budget, any reasonable approximation algorithm for submodular maximization (for instance the
greedy algorithm in [Svi04]) can detect and choose all the items that are in optimum set.
To make our mechanism monotone, we remove i before calling the oracle to decide if we should
add i to the set S, making the items selected no longer contiguous in the order we consider them.
Greedy-OM(α,A,B)
(Greedy Oracle Mechanism)
Let S = ∅
for i = 1 to n do
if v(Si) ≤ αOracle(A \ {i}, B) then
S = S ∪ {i}
end
end
return S
Random-OM(α,A,B)
(Random Oracle Mechanism)
Let A = {i : ci ≤ B}
Let i∗ = argmaxi∈[n](v(i))
With probability rα+2r do
return Greedy-OM(α,A,B)
halt
return i∗
Next we show that Greedy-OM(α,A,B) is monotone and provide its approximation ratio.
Lemma 3.11. For every fixed α ∈ (0, 1], Greedy-OM(α,A,B) is monotone. If S = Greedy-
EOM(α,A,B), k ∈ [n] is the biggest integer such that Sk−1 ⊆ S, i∗ is the item with maximum
individual value, and assuming Oracle is an r approximation of the optimum, then
r
α
v(Sk−1) + (1 +
r
α
)v(i∗) ≥ opt(A)
Proof. Monotonicity of the mechanism follows from the usual argument, increasing ci does not effect
Oracle(A\{i}, B) and decreases the item’s bang per buck in any step. To show the approximation
factor, recall that {k} = Sk \ Sk−1. Since k was not chosen by the mechanism we have
v(Sk−1) + v(k) ≥ v(Sk) > αOracle(A \ {k}) ≥ α
r
opt(A \ {k})
≥ α
r
(opt(A)− v(k)) ≥ α
r
(opt(A)− v(i∗))
Next we show that Greedy-OM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible.
Lemma 3.12. By using threshold payments, Greedy-OM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible
Proof. Let pi be the threshold payment for agent i. Let S =Greedy-OM(0.5, A,B). For every
i ∈ S, we show that if i deviates to a cost bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(S) , he cannot be selected. By proving
this and by using the definition of threshold payments we get
∑
i∈S pi ≤
∑
i∈Smi(Si−1)B/v(S) ≤∑
i∈Smi(Si−1 ∩ S)B/v(S) = B, so the mechanism is budget feasible.
Assume that i deviates to bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(S) and is still in the winning set. Let b be the resulting
costs, with i’s cost as bi and for all other players bj = cj . Note that this change in cost for i changes
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the order in which the mechanism considers the items. Let j be the step that the mechanism
considers item i with costs b. For z ∈ [n], S′z is defined similar to Sz but with cost vector b instead
of c. 3
c(S∗) ≥ b(S∗ ∪ S′j)− b(S′j) =
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
By submodularity we have mtz(S
′
j) ≥ mtz(S′j ∪ Tz−1), and by the fact that i was in position j in
the ordering considered, we have that btz/mtz(S
′
j−1) ≥ bi/mi(S′j−1). Using these we get:∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
≥
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
btz
mtz(S
′
j−1)
≥
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
bi
mi(S′j−1)
=
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗ ∪ S′j)− v(S′j)) ≥
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗)− v(S′j))
Now by using fact that Si−1 ⊆ S′j−1, as the first i− 1 steps of the algorithm are not effected by i’s
change of bid, and by the assumption about bi, we have
bi
mi(S′j−1)
(v(S∗)− v(S′j)) > B
v(S∗)− v(S′j)
v(S)
So by combining the above inequalities we have that the total cost c(S∗) of set S∗ is c(S∗) >
B(v(S∗)− v(S′j))/v(S) .
Since i was selected after deviating, we have v(S′j) ≤ αOracle(A \ {ai}, B) ≤ αv(S∗). Let
k′ ∈ [n] be the minimum integer such that S ⊆ Sk′ . Since k′ was chosen, we have v(S) ≤ v(Sk′) ≤
αOracle(A \ {ak′}, B) ≤ αv(S∗). Since α = 0.5 we get C(S∗) > B which is contradiction.
Note that in large markets v(i∗)  opt(A), so by combining lemma 3.11 and lemma 3.12, we
get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.13. In large markets, Greedy-OM(0.5, A,B) is truthful, budget feasible and given
an r-approximation oracle, achieves 2r approximation of the optimum.
The previously known best oracle mechanism for large markets is due to Anari et al [AGN14]
and achieves 2r2. We will further improve this bound for the case of large markets to r + 1 in
section 4.
By using lemma 3.11, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14. Random-OM(α,A,B) is truthful and in expectation achieves 1 + 2rα of the opti-
mum, assuming the oracle used is an r-approximation.
Proof. Let S be the outcome of the mechanism. The mechanism chooses S = Greedy-OM(γ,A,B)
with probability rα+2r and i
∗ with probability 1− rα+2r = α+rα+2r . Let k ∈ [n] be the biggest integer
such that Sk−1 ⊆ S. So we have
E[v(S)] ≥ r
α+ 2r
v(Sk−1) +
α+ r
α+ 2r
v(i∗)
⇒(1 + 2r
α
)E[v(S)] ≥ r
α
v(Sk−1) +
α+ r
α
v(i∗)
3Note that in Greedy-TM, as well as Greedy-EOM, S′j would be exactly the winning set of the mechanism at
the end of step j. However, in Greedy-OM, S′j may be a super set of the set of items that has been added to the
winning set at the end of step j.
12
So by using lemma 3.11 we have
(1 +
2r
α
)E[v(S)] ≥ opt(A)
By combining lemma 3.12 and theorem 3.14 we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.15. Random-OM(0.5, A,B) is truthful, budget feasible and in expectation achieves
1 + 4r of the optimum.
By using the greedy algorithm of [Svi04] as an oracle, we can improve the approximation ra-
tio to 2rα . To achieve this, we change Greedy-OM(α,A,B), so that instead of using Oracle(A \
{k}, B), it uses maxc′i≥ci Oracle(A, (c′i, c−i)). We also change the probability of choosing the greedy
mechanism’s outcome in Random-OM(α,A,B) to 12 . By doing so Random-OM(α,A,B) can
achieve 2rα instead of 1 +
2r
α . By using the greedy algorithm of [Svi04], as an oracle, finding
maxc′i≥ci Oracle(A, (c
′
i, c−i)) can be done in polynomial time, since we only have to check polyno-
mial number of cases for c′i. Furthermore, if i increases his cost, he cannot increase the value of
maxc′i≥ci Oracle(A, (c
′
i, c−i)). We omit the proof of the following theorem, as it is analogous to our
previous proofs.
Theorem 3.16. The above modification of the Random-OM(0.5, A,B) mechanism is truthful,
budget feasible, get expected value of a 4r fraction of the optimum. With the greedy algorithm as the
oracle, it can be implemented in polynomial time, and is a 4e/(e− 1)-approximation mechanism.
For calculating the agents’ threshold payments of our oracle mechanisms in this section, it is
enough to check what is the maximum cost that each agent i can declare such that she is still
in the winning set. Similar to section 3.1, for each agent i, this number can simply be computed
by checking where in the sorted list of agents by their marginal bang-per-buck this agent can
appear such that the inequality of Greedy-EOM(α,A,B) (for the exponential time mechanisms)
and the inequality of Greedy-OM(α,A,B) (for polynomial time mechanisms) still hold. The
characterization of these threshold payments is similar to the payment characterization of the
oracle mechanisms in [AGN14].
4 A Simple 1 + ee−1 Approximation mechanism for Large Markets
In this section we combine the two greedy parameterized mechanisms of Section 3, Greedy-
OM(α,A,B) and Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) to improve the approximation guarantee for large markets.
Given a polynomial time r approximation oracle, our simple, deterministic, truthful, and budget
feasible mechanism in this section has an approximation ratio of 1+r and runs in polynomial time.
Deterministic-Large(α, γ,A,B)
Let A = {i : ci ≤ B}
Let Sα = Greedy-OM(α,A,B)
Let Sγ = Greedy-TM(γ,A,B)
return Sα ∩ Sγ
At first glance, Deterministic-Large seems worse
than both of Greedy-OM and Greedy-Tm, since its win-
ning set is the intersection of the wining sets of these mecha-
nisms. However, taking the intersection of these mechanisms
will allow us to choose the value of α and γ to be higher than
0.5 while keeping the mechanism budget feasible.
First, note that the intersection of two monotone mechanisms is monotone.
Proposition 1. For two monotone mechanisms M1 and M2, the mechanism M that outputs the
intersection of the winning set of M1 and the winning set of M2 is monotone.
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Proof. Assume an agent i ∈ A is not in the winning set of M . This is because either i is not in
the winning set of M1 or not in the winning set of M2 (or both). W.l.o.g assume that i is not
in the winning set of M1. Since M1 is monotone, if i increases his bid, he still will not be in the
winning set of M1. This means that after i increases his bid, he is still not in the winning set of
M . Therefore, M is monotone.
Next we give a parameterized approximation guarantee for Deterministic-Large(α, γ,A,B).
Lemma 4.1. Assuming the large market assumption, for every fixed value of α, γ ∈ (0, 1] Deterministic-
Large(α, γ,A,B) is monotone. Furthermore, with an r approximation oracle, it has a worst case
approximation ratio of max(1 + 1γ ,
r
α).
Proof. From Proposition 1, Lemmas 3.2, 3.11 it follows that Deterministic-Large is monotone.
Let S be the outcome of the mechanism. Let k be the biggest integer such that Sk−1 ⊆ S, i.e.,
Sk−1 ⊆ Sα and Sk−1 ⊆ Sγ . By definition k /∈ S, so there are two cases
• k /∈ Sα: By lemma 3.11, the large market assumption and monotonicity of v(.), we have
r
αv(S) ≈ rαv(S) + (1 + rα)v(i∗) ≥ rαv(Sk−1) + (1 + rα)v(i∗) ≥ opt(A,B).
• k /∈ Sγ : By lemma 3.2, the large market assumption and monotonicity of v(.), we have
(1 + 1γ )v(Sk−1) ≈ (1 + 1γ )v(Sk−1) + 1γ v(i∗) ≥ opt(A,B).
In both cases we have, max(1 + 1γ ,
r
α)v(S) ≥ opt(A,B) assuming that v(i∗) is negligible.
Now we provide a simple condition for the budget feasibility of Deterministic-Large(α, γ,A,B).
Lemma 4.2. If α ≤ 11+γ for any α, γ ≥ 0, then by using threshold payments, Deterministic-
Large(α, γ,A,B) is budget feasible.
Proof. Let pi be the threshold payment for agent i. Let S =Deterministic-Large(α, γ,A,B).
For every i ∈ S, we show that if i deviates to bidding a cost bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(S) , he cannot be
in the winning set. By proving this and by using the definition of threshold payments we get∑
i∈S pi ≤
∑
i∈Smi(Si−1)
B
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈Smi(Si−1 ∩ S) Bv(S) = B, so the mechanism is budget feasible.
We prove above claim by contradiction: assume that i deviates to bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(S) and is in
the winning set. Let b be the new cost vector and j be position of i in the new order of items. Let
S′z for z ∈ [n] be defined similar to Sz but with cost vector b instead of c. So S′j is the set of items
that are in the winning set of Greedy-TM(γ,A,B) at the end of step j once i is added. Note
that S′j is also equal to the set of all the items that has been considered by Greedy-OM(α,A,B)
at the end of its j-th step. So by using the same argument as proof of lemma 3.12 we get
c(S∗) > B
v(S∗)− v(S′j)
v(S)
and v(S′j), v(S) ≤ αv(S∗)
By defining x =
v(S′j)
v(S) , we have v(S
′
j) = xv(S) ≤ αxv(S∗). So we get
c(S∗) > B
v(S∗)− v(S′j))
v(S)
> B
(1− α)v(S∗)
αxv(S∗)
= B
1− α
αx
so if 1−α ≥ αx, or equivalently, α ≤ 11+x then we get c(S∗) > B which is the desired contradiction.
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Since i ∈ Sγ , we also have
bi
mi(S′j)
≤ γ B
v(S′j)
=
γ
x
B
v(S)
So since mi(S
′
j) ≤ mi(Si−1), if γ ≤ x, we get to a contradiction with the assumption about bi.
The only remaining case is when γ > x and α > 11+x . This means that α >
1
1+γ which is a
contradiction with the property in the statement of lemma, so the mechanism is budget feasible.
By using Lemmas 4.1, 4.2, the main theorem of this section follows.
Theorem 4.3. By using threshold payments, Deterministic-Large ( rr+1 ,
1
r ) is truthful, budget
feasible, and 1 + r approximation of the optimum. By using the greedy algorithm with r = e/(e− 1)
we get a mechanism with approximation guarantee of ≈ 2.58.
Proof. By lemma 4.1 we know that the mechanism is monotone, so by using threshold payments,
the mechanism is truthful.
Let S be the winning set of the mechanism. By lemma 4.1, we have
max(1 +
1
γ
,
r
α
)v(S) ≥ opt(A,B)
⇒max(1 + r, rr
r+1
)v(S) ≥ opt(A,B)
⇒(1 + r)v(S) ≥ opt(A,B)
So the mechanism is 1 + r approximation of the optimum.
We also have that
α =
r
r + 1
=
1
γ
γ+1
γ
=
1
1 + γ
So by lemma 4.2 the mechanism is budget feasible.
By choosing the oracle to be the greedy algorithm in [Svi04], which is ee−1 approximation of the
optimum, the approximation ratio of Deterministic-Large is 1 + ee−1 ≈ 2.58.
In order to calculate the threshold payment of the agents in winning set of this mechanism, it is
enough to calculate the threshold payment of each agent in the threshold mechanism and the oracle
mechanism inside Deterministic-Large(α, γ,A,B), and declare their minimum as the payment
of the agent.
5 Application to hiring in Crowdsourcing Markets
In this section, we consider an application of our knapsack problem with heterogeneous items to
the problem of a principal hiring in a Crowdsourcing Market. We consider the model where there
is a set of agents A that can be hired and a set of tasks T that the principal would like to get get
done. Each agent a ∈ A has a private cost. We represent the abilities of the agents by a bipartite
graph G(A, T ), where edge e = (a, t) in the G indicates that agent a can be used for task t. The
value of buyer for each edge e is ve, which can be different for each edge. The principal has a
budget B, and would like to hire agents with cost under her budget to maximize the total value of
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the task done. The optimal solution for this problem is a maximum value matching, subject to the
budget constraint on the cost of the agents hired.
Such knapsack with heterogeneous items and agents with matching constraints were studied
by [Sin10, CGL11, GNS14]. There are many ways for modeling the heterogeneity of items. In
[CGL11], this heterogeneity has been defined by having types for items where at most one item can
be chosen from each type, corresponding to a bipartite graph where agents have degree 1. [GNS14]
consider our model of agents and tasks with a bipartite graph, but assume that the principal has a
fixed value for each task completed, independent of the agent that took care of the task, so values
of the edges entering a task node t are all equal.
In this section, we apply our technique from section 4 for this problem. We first consider the
general problem defied above, but relax the assumption that the allocation should always assigned
each agent in the winning set to a unique task. Turns out that allowing the principal to hire extra
agents simplifies the problem. We define the value of the buyer for the winning set S to be the value
of the maximum matching on the induced subgraph G[S, T ]. Then we consider the special case of
[GNS14], where the principal has a value for each task, independent of who completes the task. For
this case, we show that a small change in our mechanism (stopping it when the marginal increase
in value is 0) results in the same approximation guarantee while observing the hard constraint that
all agents hired need to be assigned to a task.
General Crowdsourcing Markets The following proposition states that the maximum value
of a matching in the induced subgraph G[S, T ] for a subset of agents S is a monotone submodular
function of S. The monotonicity proof follows directly from the definition. It is not hard to prove
that the function is also submodular (see [Rab16] ).
Proposition 2. For S ⊆ A, if f(S) is the value of maximum weight matching of the induced
subgraph G[S, T ] of the weighted bipartite graph G(A, T ), then f(S) is a monotone submodular
function.
This proposition implies that all our truthful budget feasible mechanisms for submodular val-
uations can be used for this model.
Corollary 5.1. Any budget feasible truthful mechanism for submodular valuations, can also be used
without any loss in the approximation guarantee for case of heterogeneous tasks (items), if it is OK
to have agents in the winning set who are not assigned to any tasks.
Hiring with strict matching constraint. Now, consider the case where the buyer’s value is
defined by summation of her value for each task, i.e. for all the edges that are directly connected
to the same task, the value of the buyer for those edge is the same. We argue that in this model, if
we add the hard constraint each agent in the winning set should be assigned to a unique task, then
with a small change in our mechanisms, all our results still hold. This problem was considered by
[GNS14] for large markets, who gave a randomized truthful (in expectation) and budget feasible
mechanism with a 1+ ee−1 approximation guarantee for large markets (the main result of [GNS14]).
Next lemma shows how one can use our deterministic truthful budget feasible mechanism for large
markets to get the same approximation guarantee.
Lemma 5.2. For S ⊆ A, let f(S) be the value of maximum weighted matching of the induced
subgraph G[S, T ] of the weighted bipartite graph G(A, T ) in which all the edges that connect to the
same node of T has the same value. If a maximum weight matching induced by S ⊆ A connects all
vertices in S to a vertex in T , and for a ∈ A \ S, f(S ∪ {a})− f(S) > 0, then there is a maximum
weight matching induced by S ∪ {a} which is also assigning each agent to a unique task.
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Proof. We use contradiction. Assume that there is a subset of agents S ⊆ A such that there is a
maximum matching M in the subgraph of G, induced by vertices of S and T that connects each
agent in S to a task in T . Let a ∈ A be an agent such that f(S ∪ {a})− f(S) > 0 and there is no
maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S′ = S ∪ {a} and T that connects each agent in
S′ to a task in T . Let M ′ be a maximum matching of this induced subgraph. Let G′ be the union
of edges in M and M ′ and let C and P be the set of cycles and paths that contain all the edges of
G′. Since M and M ′ are both maximum matchings, we have W (M ∩ c) = W (M ′ ∩ c) for all c ∈ C.
Since the only difference between S and S′ is having a, there can only be one path p ∈ P such that
W (p ∩M ′) > W (p ∩M). Furthermore, one of the end points of p should be a and for all other
paths p′ ∈ P that p′ 6= p, W (p′ ∩M) = W (p′ ∩M ′). For p there are two cases
• The edge that is connected to the other endpoint of p is in M : in this case, since the value
of matching is defined by tasks, W (p ∩M) = W (p ∩M ′). Therefore, W (M) = W (M ′) and
F (S′)− F (S) = 0 which is a contradiction.
• The edge that is connected to the other endpoint of p is in M ′: In this case if we define a
matching M∗ = (M \ p) ∪ (M ′ ∩ p), then M∗ will connect each agent in S′ to a unique task,
which is a contradiction.
This means that we reach contradiction in both cases, and the proof is complete.
For using lemma 5.2 in our mechanisms, we only have to stop considering items in the sorted list
of marginal bang-per-bucks whenever the marginal bang-per-buck of the item is 0. Note that since
the items are listed in decreasing order of marginal bang-per-buck and we know that the valuation
is submodular, doing this will not have any effects on the approximation ratio (since the marginal
bang-per-buck of the next items is also 0) and truthfulness (since the threshold payment of an agent
whose item has 0 marginal value is 0) of our mechanisms. The following corollary summarizes this
result.
Corollary 5.3. The truthful budget feasible threshold and oracle mechanisms, as well as the large
markets mechanism for submodular valuations of this paper without any loss in the approximation
ratio can be also used for the case of heterogeneous tasks, with the constraint that each agent in the
winning set should be assigned to a unique task (matching constraint).
For the case of large markets, using Theorem 4.3 of section 4 gives a deterministic truthful and
budget feasible mechanism for this problem, matching the 1 + ee−1 guarantee of the randomized
truthful (in expectation) mechanism of [GNS14], while keeping the mechanism deterministic.
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A Deferred Proof of Theorem 3.4
Recall Theorem 3.4, which states that Random-TM(0.5, A,B) and Greedy-TM(0.5, A,B) are
budget feasible.
Proof. In order to prove Random-TM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible, we only have to show Greedy-
TM(0.5, A,B) is budget feasible, since when i∗ is selected, his threshold payment is B and the
mechanism is budget feasible.
Let pi be the threshold payment for agent i. Let Sk−1 =Greedy-TM(0.5, A,B) the set returned
by the greedy threshold mechanism. For every i ∈ Sk−1, we show that if i deviates to bidding a cost
bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) , then he would not be selected. This will imply that the threshold payment pi
for player i is at most pi ≤ mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) , and so we get
∑
i∈Sk−1 pi ≤
∑
i∈Sk−1 mi(Si−1)
B
v(Sk−1)
=
B, so the mechanism is budget feasible.
Consider the run of Greedy-TM where i deviated to bidding bi > mi(Si−1) Bv(Sk−1) and is
selected, while all other players bid truthfully. Let b denote the resulting cost-vector. Note that by
bidding higher, player i would occur later in the order. Let j be the step in which i would occur,
after he deviates to bidding cost bi. Let S
′
j be the items that are in the winning set at the end of
this step (S′z for z ∈ [n] is defined similar to Sz but with cost vector b instead of c, with the change
in one cost also effecting the order of items after item i). If i is in the winning set, we have
bi
mi(S′j−1)
≤ 0.5 B
v(S′j−1)
Since the items are sorted by their marginal bang per buck, for every z ∈ Sk−1, cz ≤ 0.5Bmz(Sz−1)v(Sk−1) ,
so we have c(Sk−1) ≤ 0.5B. Let T = Sk−1 \ S′j = {t1, t2, . . . , tq}, T0 = ∅ and Tz = {tl : l ∈ [z]}. So
we have
v(Sk−1)− v(S′j) ≤ v(Sk−1 ∪ S′j)− v(S′j) =
∑
z∈[q]
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1) =
∑
z∈[q]
ctz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
ctz
By submodularity we have ∑
z∈[q]
ctz
mtz(S
′
j ∪ Tz−1)
ctz
≤
∑
z∈[q]
ctz
mtz(S
′
j−1)
ctz
Since i is selected at step j it means it has the highest marginal bang per buck at that step. The
cost vectors b and c are also only different in the cost of i. So we have∑
z∈[q]
ctz
mtz(S
′
j−1)
ctz
≤
∑
z∈[q]
ctz
mi(S
′
j−1)
bi
≤ mi(S
′
j−1)
bi
∑
z∈[q]
ctz
Since i has increased his cost, he cannot be selected before step i, so Si ⊆ S′j and v(Si) ≤ v(S′j).
By using this and contradiction assumption we have
mi(S
′
j−1)
bi
∑
z∈[q]
ctz <
v(Sk−1)
B
B
2
=
v(Sk−1)
2
So v(Sk−1) ≤ 2v(S′j). By adding this to the previous inequality and replacing mi(S′j−1) with
mi(Si−1) (note that we can do this since Si−1 ⊆ S′j−1), we get to a contradiction.
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